Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Francois-Marie Voltaire, John Searle and E.M. Cioran

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181 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
So-called wisdom is just pondering things instead of acting [Cioran]
Wisdom is just the last gasp of a dying civilization [Cioran]
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 1. History of Ideas
The history of ideas (and deeds) occurs in a meaningless environment [Cioran]
Intelligence only fully flourishes at the end of a historical period [Cioran]
Ideas are neutral, but people fill them with passion and weakness [Cioran]
A nation gives expression to its sum of values, and is then exhausted [Cioran]
Some thinkers would have been just as dynamic, no matter when they had lived [Cioran]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
I abandoned philosophy because it didn't acknowledge melancholy and human weakness [Cioran]
Originality in philosophy is just the invention of terms [Cioran]
The mind is superficial, only concerned with the arrangement of events, not their significance [Cioran]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is a universalisation of physical anguish [Cioran]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Great systems of philosophy are just brilliant tautologies [Cioran]
Systems are the worst despotism, in philosophy and in life [Cioran]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics
A text explained ceases to be a text [Cioran]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Entailment and validity are relations, but inference is a human activity [Searle]
Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason [Searle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
Rationality is the way we coordinate our intentionality [Searle]
Rationality is built into the intentionality of the mind, and its means of expression [Searle]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
No great idea ever emerged from a dialogue [Cioran]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
Truth is just an error insufficiently experienced [Cioran]
Eventually every 'truth' is guaranteed by the police [Cioran]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Correspondence to the facts HAS to be the aim of enquiry [Searle]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
If complex logic requires rules, then so does basic logic [Searle]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
Negation doesn't arise from reasoning, but from deep instincts [Cioran]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
We don't normally think of names as having senses (e.g. we don't give definitions of them) [Searle]
How can a proper name be correlated with its object if it hasn't got a sense? [Searle]
'Aristotle' means more than just 'an object that was christened "Aristotle"' [Searle]
Reference for proper names presupposes a set of uniquely referring descriptions [Searle]
Proper names are logically connected with their characteristics, in a loose way [Searle]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax [Searle]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
An axiom has no more authority than a frenzy [Cioran]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
The word 'being' is very tempting, but in fact means nothing at all [Cioran]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Reduction can be of things, properties, ideas or causes [Searle]
Reduction is either by elimination, or by explanation [Searle]
Eliminative reduction needs a gap between appearance and reality, as in sunsets [Searle]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
Users of 'supervenience' blur its causal and constitutive meanings [Searle]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Solidity in a piston is integral to its structure, not supervenient [Maslin on Searle]
Is supervenience just causality? [Searle, by Maslin]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
People who really believe anti-realism don't bother to prove it [Cioran]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Reality is entirely particles in force fields [Searle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
A property is 'emergent' if it is caused by elements of a system, when the elements lack the property [Searle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
Some properties depend on components, others on their relations [Searle]
Fully 'emergent' properties contradict our whole theory of causation [Searle]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief) [Searle]
A belief is a commitment to truth [Searle]
We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth [Searle]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
Beliefs only make sense as part of a network of other beliefs [Searle]
Beliefs are part of a network, and also exist against a background [Searle]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
Convictions are failures to study anything thoroughly [Cioran]
Opinions are fine, but having convictions means something has gone wrong [Cioran]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
Thinking must involve a self, not just an "it" [Searle]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Perception is a function of expectation [Searle]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
Memory is mainly a guide for current performance [Searle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states [Searle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it [Searle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events) [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
We don't have a "theory" that other people have minds [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
Other minds are not inferred by analogy, but are our best explanation [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
We experience unity at an instant and across time [Searle]
Explanation of how we unify our mental stimuli into a single experience is the 'binding problem' [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
Our instincts had to be blunted and diminished, to make way for consciousness! [Cioran]
A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot [Searle]
Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint [Searle]
There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
The mind experiences space, but it is not experienced as spatial [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
Conscious creatures seem able to discriminate better [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
Unconscious thoughts are those capable of causing conscious ones [Searle]
Consciousness results directly from brain processes, not from some intermediary like information [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Either there is intrinsic intentionality, or everything has it [Searle]
Water flowing downhill can be described as if it had intentionality [Searle]
Intentional phenomena only make sense within a background [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Intentionality is defined in terms of representation [Searle]
Consciousness is essential and basic to intentionality [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
The use of 'qualia' seems to imply that consciousness and qualia are separate [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
Pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself [Searle]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 2. Persons as Responsible
Being held responsible for past actions makes no sense without personal identity [Searle]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 3. Persons as Reasoners
Giving reasons for action requires reference to a self [Searle]
A 'self' must be capable of conscious reasonings about action [Searle]
An intentional, acting, rational being must have a self [Searle]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
Action requires a self, even though perception doesn't [Searle]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 1. Self and Consciousness
A self must at least be capable of consciousness [Searle]
Selfs are conscious, enduring, reasonable, active, free, and responsible [Searle]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced [Searle]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations
The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally [Searle]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
Neither introspection nor privileged access makes sense [Searle]
Introspection is just thinking about mental states, not a special sort of vision [Searle]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
I cannot observe my own subjectivity [Searle]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
Rational decision making presupposes free will [Searle]
Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action [Searle]
We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective [Searle]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
If people always acted without words we would take them for robots [Cioran]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Mind and brain don't interact if they are the same [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
Without internal content, a zombie's full behaviour couldn't be explained [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Wanting H2O only differs from wanting water in its mental component [Searle]
Mental states only relate to behaviour contingently, not necessarily [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Functionalists like the externalist causal theory of reference [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
Maybe understanding doesn't need consciousness, despite what Searle seems to think [Searle, by Chalmers]
A program won't contain understanding if it is small enough to imagine [Dennett on Searle]
If bigger and bigger brain parts can't understand, how can a whole brain? [Dennett on Searle]
A program for Chinese translation doesn't need to understand Chinese [Searle]
I now think syntax is not in the physics, but in the eye of the beholder [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
Computation presupposes consciousness [Searle]
If we are computers, who is the user? [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
Consciousness has a first-person ontology, so it cannot be reduced without omitting something [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
Consciousness is a brain property as liquidity is a water property [Searle]
Property dualism denies reductionism [Searle]
Property dualists tend to find the mind-body problem baffling [Searle]
Property dualism is the reappearance of Cartesianism [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
There is non-event causation between mind and brain, as between a table and its solidity [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Mind and brain are supervenient in respect of cause and effect [Searle]
If mind-brain supervenience isn't causal, this implies epiphenomenalism [Searle]
Mental events can cause even though supervenient, like the solidity of a piston [Searle]
Upwards mental causation makes 'supervenience' irrelevant [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
Consciousness seems indefinable by conditions or categories [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
The pattern of molecules in the sea is much more complex than the complexity of brain neurons [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Can the homunculus fallacy be beaten by recursive decomposition? [Searle]
Searle argues that biology explains consciousness, but physics won't explain biology [Searle, by Kriegel/Williford]
If mind is caused by brain, does this mean mind IS brain? [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
If tree rings contain information about age, then age contains information about rings [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
If mind is multiply realisable, it is possible that anything could realise it [Searle]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
We don't postulate folk psychology, we experience it [Searle]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / b. Turing Machines
Computation isn't a natural phenomenon, it is a way of seeing phenomena [Searle]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Content is much more than just sentence meaning [Searle]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
There is no such thing as 'wide content' [Searle]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
We explain behaviour in terms of actual internal representations in the agent [Searle]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
We use concepts to master our fears; saying 'death' releases us from confronting it [Cioran]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / a. Concepts and language
If only we could write like a reptile, of endless sensations and no concepts! [Cioran]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Meaning is derived intentionality [Searle]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
Philosophy of language is a branch of philosophy of mind [Searle]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 1. Syntax
Universal grammar doesn't help us explain anything [Searle]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
Shared Background makes translation possible, though variation makes it hard [Searle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it [Searle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable [Searle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
The essence of humanity is desire-independent reasons for action [Searle]
Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act [Searle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
I want to suppress in myself the normal reasons people have for action [Cioran]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
We could only be responsible if we had consented before birth to who we are [Cioran]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 6. The Sublime
We morally dissolve if we spend time with excessive beauty [Cioran]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
At a civilisation's peak values are all that matters, and people unconsciously live by them [Cioran]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Values don't accumulate; they are ruthlessly replaced [Cioran]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
If it is true, you ought to believe it [Searle]
If this is a man, you ought to accept similar things as men [Searle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / b. Successful function
The function of a heart depends on what we want it to do [Searle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Lovers are hateful, apart from their hovering awareness of death [Cioran]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
The Golden Rule is accepted everywhere, and gives a fixed target for morality [Voltaire]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 3. Promise Keeping
Promises hold because I give myself a reason, not because it is an institution [Searle]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
'Ought' implies that there is a reason to do something [Searle]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
To live authentically, we must see that philosophy is totally useless [Cioran]
Man is never himself; he always aims at less than life, or more than life [Cioran]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
Evidence suggests that humans do not have a purpose [Cioran]
The pointlessness of our motives and irrelevance of our gestures reveals our vacuity [Cioran]
The universe is dirty and fragile, as if a scandal in nothingness had produced its matter [Cioran]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 3. Angst
Unlike other creatures, mankind seems lost in nature [Cioran]
We can only live because our imagination and memory are poor [Cioran]
Life is now more dreaded than death [Cioran]
In anxiety people cling to what reinforces it, because it is a deep need [Cioran]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
No one is brave enough to say they don't want to do anything; we despise such a view [Cioran]
It is better to watch the hours pass, than trying to fill them [Cioran]
Fear cures boredom, because it is stronger [Cioran]
You are stuck in the past if you don't know boredom [Cioran]
If you lack beliefs, boredom is your martyrdom [Cioran]
History is the bloody rejection of boredom [Cioran]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / b. Natural authority
It is pointless to refuse or accept the social order; we must endure it like the weather [Cioran]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / a. Autocracy
Opportunists can save a nation, and heroes can ruin it [Cioran]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
The ideal is to impose a religion by force, and then live in doubt about its beliefs [Cioran]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
Despite endless suggestions, no one has found a goal for history [Cioran]
History is wonderfully devoid of meaning [Cioran]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
Suicide is pointless, because it always comes too late [Cioran]
No one has ever found a good argument against suicide [Cioran]
Religions see suicide as insubordination [Cioran]
If you have not contemplated suicide, you are a miserable worm [Cioran]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 5. Sexual Morality
We all need sexual secrets! [Cioran]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
Chemistry entirely explains plant behaviour [Searle]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Mind involves fighting, fleeing, feeding and fornicating [Searle]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
You can only know the limits of knowledge if you know the other side of the limit [Searle]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
Why is God so boring, and why does God resemble humanity so little? [Cioran]
29. Religion / C. Spiritual Disciplines / 2. Taoism
As the perfect wisdom of detachment, philosophy offers no rivals to Taoism [Cioran]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
When man abandons religion, he then follows new fake gods and mythologies [Cioran]
A religion needs to motivate killings, and cannot tolerate rivals [Cioran]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / d. Heaven
The first man obviously found paradise unendurable [Cioran]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / e. Hell
Circles of hell are ridiculous; all that matters is to be there [Cioran]